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Abstract 
This research, motivated by a real-life case study in a highly competitive automobile supply chain, 
experimentally studies the impact of disruption on the competitiveness of supply chains. The studied supply 
chain faces two major risks: disruption of suppliers and tough competition from competitors. Any disruption in 
upstream level of the supply chain leads to an inability to meet demand downstream and causes market share to 
be lost to the competitors. For such a setting, a resilient topology is redesigned that can recover from and react 
quickly to any disruptive incidents. To this aim, we speculate there are three policies that can be used to 
mitigate the disruption risk, namely keeping emergency stock at the retailers, reserving back-up capacity at the 
suppliers, and multiple-sourcing. The problem is addressed using a mixed integer non-linear model to find the 
most profitable network and mitigation policies. We design a piecewise linear method to solve the model. 
Based on the data extracted from an automotive supply chain, practical insights of the research are extracted in 
a controlled experiment. Our analysis suggests that implementing risk mitigation policies not only work to the 
advantage of the supply chain by sustaining and improving its market share but also benefit customers by 
stabilizing retail prices in the market. Using the case study, we analyze the contribution of each risk strategy in 
stabilizing the supply chain’s profit, market share, and retail price. Our analysis reveals that downstream 
“emergency stock” is the most preferable risk mitigation strategy if suppliers are unreliable. 
Keywords: Supply chain management; resilient supply chain; disruption; competition; automotive industry. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On March 17, 2000, a line of thunderstorms at Albuquerque, New Mexico caused some fluctuations in the 
electricity system that led to a fire at a Philips semiconductor manufacturing plant. This plant was the only 
supplier of chips to the two giant cell phone manufacturers Nokia and Ericsson. Consequently, Philips had to 
halt its chip production at this plant. The reactions of the two companies to this event were markedly different. 
Nokia reacted promptly by reserving capacity in other plants worldwide and procuring some commodity chips. 
However, Ericsson woke up about six weeks later when there were hardly any alternative sources left in the 
market and therefore bore the brunt of the disruption. This disruption led the company to lose a huge share of 
the market, mainly to Nokia, such that in 2001 Ericsson announced its retreat from the phone handset market 
(Sheffi, 2007). With the globalization of the supply chains (SCs), they have become more vulnerable to 
disruptive events. For example as an aftermath of the earthquake in Japan in March 2011, 80% of the 
automobile plant in Japan suspended production. Nissan Motor Company Ltd was perceived to have most 
suffered from the disaster compared to its competitors. Despite this devastation, Nissan’s recovery was 
remarkably better than the competitors. During the next six months after disaster, Nissan’s production in Japan 
decreased by only 3.8% whereas the industry decrease was 24.8%. More interestingly, Nissan could benefit 
from this incident and increased the production by the end of 2011 by 9.3% while the industry-wide production 
indicated a decrease of 9.3% (Schmidt and Simchi-Levi, 2013).  
What is very apparent from these cases is that in the markets that are highly competitive an enterprise that 
fails to sustain its operations in the face of disruption is very likely to be taken over by its competitors. The 
focal question entailed by these examples is how a supply chain (SC) can be designed to be able to react to 
adverse incidents in a timely manner and not to lose but even benefit from the incidents by consolidating and 
increasing the market share similar to what Nokia and Nissan could achieve. One answer suggested in the 
literature is applying the concept of resilient SCs (Sheffi, 2007). Resilience for companies, measures their 
ability to quickly return to their normal performance level – i.e., production, services and fill rate – after 
disruption. One way to achieve resilience is through creating redundancy (Sheffi, 2007). The standard use of 
redundancy includes holding safety and emergency stock of material and finished goods, the deliberate use of 
multiple suppliers and low capacity utilization rates to hedge against disruptions.  
Hendricks and Singhal (2005) report that SC glitches and disruptions can lead to both short- and long-term 
loss in sales and market share. The major harm to the company after a disruption comes not from the direct 
damages to facilities but in the market share lost to the competitors. It is because SC disruptions could prevent a 
firm from capitalizing on strong market demand due to unavailability of products and as a consequence the 
market share is lost to the competitors. Despite the significance of SC network design (SCND) on the aftermath 
of the disruptions when there is competition in the market, a huge body of the literature concerns monopoly 
situations with a guaranteed demand in which the competitors and their market shares have effectively been 
ignored. One of the strongest motivations behind this research is to address the SCND problem when it is 
subject to unforeseen disruptions and SC operates in a competitive environment. Inspired by a real-life case 
from automotive industry, some of the main questions that we address in this study are as follows: How SCs 
can build in redundancy at the design stage in order to create resilience? How can policies such as keeping 
extra emergency stocks, having back-up suppliers and anticipating the need for reserve capacity enable SCs to 
3 
 
hedge against SCs’ market share loss and retail price fluctuations? Moreover, considering the extremely 
competitive nature of today’s SCs, we investigate how these mitigation policies might assist SCs to maintain 
their market shares when facing with disruptions. Implementing these policies comes at a cost, so the other 
pertinent issue that we investigate is whether the benefits to be gained outweigh the losses. Using a controlled 
experiment, we also address the contribution of various risk mitigation strategies to the SC profit, stability of 
price and market shares. Our results show that, even though such policies might be considered costly and place 
an extra burden on SCs, once implemented they will have significant benefits if a disruption occurs. Moreover, 
in a competitive market, they prevent there being an under-supply of products and they therefore lead to price 
reductions for consumers. Moreover, this research shows the major harm to SCs exposed to disasters comes not 
from the direct damages caused by the disruption to facilities but in the market share lost to competitors. This 
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of several research streams in the literature 
pertinent to our work. Section 3 introduces the case study as the core of the paper and describes the challenges 
faced by the company and issues to be addressed by the model. Section 4 explains formulation of the problem 
and suggests a solution approach. Section 5 discusses experimental analyses based on a case study; it also 
includes insights for practitioners under different scenarios. Finally, section 6 concludes the research. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The most relevant stream of literature to this study is SC risk management. The main focus of this stream is to 
address, manage and respond to different sources of uncertainty existing in a SC. It is argued that the nature of 
uncertainty might be different but can be categorized into two broad groups, namely fluctuation and disruption. 
Fluctuation is a kind of uncertainty that includes expected, small and frequent variations such as fluctuations in 
market demand (Schütz et al., 2009), in price of raw materials, energy and labor (Sharma and Banerjee, 2013), 
in both future demand and cost (Tian and Yue, 2014), in the amount of nonconforming products violating 
certain standards (Khan et al., 2014), in the amount of damaged products or delays in the transportation system 
(Lewis, 2013). Fluctuations usually impact the operational-level decisions throughout the SC network. 
Disruption can involve the kind of uncertainty that includes unexpected, huge and infrequent variations 
such as unavailability of facilities due to bankruptcy, fire, labor strikes, floods, earthquakes, etc. (Kleindorfer 
and Saad, 2005; Chopra et al., 2007) and breakdown in transportation due to extreme weather conditions, 
closure of national borders due to wars, sanctions, terrorist attacks or strikes at ports (Wilson, 2007). Potential 
disruptions should be considered in strategic-level decisions dealing with the selection of SC partners and the 
design of the SC network structure.  
Several risk mitigation strategies for lessening the impact of disruption are explored in the literature. Tang 
and Tomlin (2008) argue that mitigation strategies create flexibility in SCs that leads to a better performance. 
These mitigation strategies are discussed and implemented either at a strategic or an operational level. A 
popular strategy in both practice and literature is to anticipate back-up facilities such that if there is disruption 
to a critical facility, the back-up facilities can then be utilized to maintain the production process (Chopra et al., 
2007; Dada et al., 2007). Another approach is to create redundant or extra reserve capacity in some facilities to 
be used if disruption occurs (Chopra et al., 2007; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004). Moreover, at the operational level, 
other strategies have been proposed as a way of neutralizing the risk of fluctuations such as keeping safety 
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stock in the inventory system (Shen and Daskin, 2005), production postponement and downward substitution 
(Lin and Wang, 2011). Another popular strategy is sourcing from multiple suppliers in case of supplier 
unreliability that can be in the form of back-up facilities or extra reserve capacity (Tomlin, 2006; Feng and Shi, 
2011). 
Some researchers address the problem of designing a SC in the presence of risk and uncertainty. Goh et al. 
(2007) provide a solution to a stochastic model of the multi-stage global SCND including location and 
distribution decisions. The research takes into account supply, demand, exchange, and disruption risk. Qi et al. 
(2010) study an integrated SC design under random supply disruption. The model determines the locations of 
retailers and the allocation of customers to retailers such that the total cost is minimized. Klibi and Martel 
(2012) study various models applicable to the design of resilient SC network for both location and distribution 
under uncertainty. Baghalian et al. (2013) develop a stochastic programming formulation to model a multi-
product SCN with both demand and supply uncertainties. Huang and Goetschalckx (2014) define the strategic 
robust SC design as the set of all Pareto-optimal configurations considering efficiency and risk simultaneously, 
where the risk is measured by the standard deviation of the efficiency. Interested readers may refer to Klibi et 
al. (2010) and Farahani et al. (2014) to learn about the literature of SCND under uncertainty and the models 
used to address these problems.  
So far, the existing literature on SCND for risk management only considers monopoly situations. This 
basically results in ignoring the impact of SC disruptions on inability to meet the demand in the market, which 
could possibly have the highest negative impact on SCs in the event of disruptions. What differentiates this 
paper from the rest of the literature on SCND is that, we analyze the impact of incorporating the risk 
management strategies on the competitive capabilities of SCs such as captureable market share, profit-ability 
and retail price.  
One other relevant topic in the literature is the study of ripple effect in supply chains (Ivanov et al., 2014a, 
2014b). Ripple effect is defined as studying the impact of a disruption on supply chain performance and 
disruption-based scope of changes in the supply structures and flows (Ivanov et al. 2014b).  In this research we 
do not explicitly address the ripple effect. However, it is implicitly related to this effect as it captures the impact 
of disruption at any stage within the supply chain on the price of the product and market share lost to the 
competitors. In other words, we study how the impact of disruption ripples through the supply chain and 
impacts the downstream side of the chain. 
The other relevant stream of literature to this study is the competition between SCs. Boyaci and Gallego 
(2004) have investigated the problem of chain-to-chain competition on customer service. They show that a 
coordinated strategy is dominant and customers are the only beneficiaries under such strategy. Zhang (2005) 
studies a network consisting of multiple heterogeneous SCs competing on the market share and characterizes 
optimal market share in equilibrium. Xiao and Yang (2006) develop a price-service competition model of two 
SCs under demand uncertainty. They analyze the effects of the retailers’ risk sensitivity on the players’ optimal 
strategies. Ha and Tong (2008) study contracting mechanisms that can lead to information sharing between two 
competing SCs. This stream of the literature addresses the competition between the SC and rivals while the 
network structure of the SC is assumed to be predetermined. However, in this study, given the significant 
impact of SC structure on the price and market shares, the considered competitive SCND problem goes beyond 
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a competitive SC planning. We present a model that optimizes the design of the SC network including the 
number, location and capacity decisions for different entities within the SC. Furthermore, we also account for 
the possibility of supply disruption and, accordingly, consider risk mitigation strategies by creating an optimal 
level of redundancy in the network. The redundancy is created through emergency stock, reserve capacity and 
backup suppliers. The model allows us to study the impact of such design on cost efficiency and market share 
under supply uncertainty. 
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The problem studied in this paper is based on a real-world case. In this section, the case problem is briefly 
explained. Then, the problem is defined in a form which is more appropriate for modeling. 
3.1. Case study: SMAC company  
The case problem is in the automotive industry but the names of the companies involved are anonymized. 
SMAC is one of the largest axial parts and reverse idler gear shaft producers in the region having some 
automotive manufacturers as customers of those parts. To produce these items, SMAC needs to procure two 
components, CK45 steel and barbed pin. AKC is the sole supplier of barbed pin but CK45 steel can be sourced 
from YIC as a national supplier and also from overseas suppliers
1
. The abundance of shaft providers in the 
market and the similar quality of their products mean that these rival companies compete in the market on the 
basis of product price. 
At present, disruption and delay in procuring CK45 steel from suppliers is one of the most crucial 
challenges for SMAC, forcing the company to redesign its network structure to mitigate the negative effects of 
this uncertainty. It operates in a very competitive environment and any disruption has a drastic effect on its 
market share. To guard against the effects of future disruptions, SMAC wants to redesign its SC and for this it 
needs to make the following decisions: I) which suppliers should be selected (opportunity for multiple-
sourcing)?; II) at each selected supplier, how much production capacity should be assigned to SMAC? 
(opportunity for extra capacity); and III) how should the demand for CK45 steel be assigned to the suppliers in 
the event of disruption? Moreover, it is also planned to keep emergency stock in the SC network, thus requiring 
two further decisions: I) where these stocks should be located? and II) how many products should be stored in 
each place? Reverse idler gear shaft is a cheap product with Make-To-Stock (MTS) production strategy. 
Therefore, it is a viable option to recommend SMAC to keep emergency stocks in its retailers’ locations.   
In the case problem, we only focus on possibility of disruption in SMAC’s suppliers. However, the models 
developed in Section 4 could be easily extended to handle disruptions in all facilities of SCs (including 
manufacturers, retailers and transportation links in between). In the models, we define some scenarios 
corresponding to possible disruptions. Each scenario is shown by a subset of SC’s paths that are out-of-use in 
the event of disruption because at least one of their passing facilities (such as supplier, manufacturer, or 
retailer) or connecting links is disrupted.  This modeling approach allows us to incorporate any possible 
disruption in the network. 
                                                          
1
 Having one common and large supplier/ manufacturer is one of characteristics of this case. While in some other research 
works such as Zhao (2008), Ha and Tong (2008) and Narayanan and Raman (2005) existence of only one supplier is 
presumed, the research methodology can simply be generalized to more than one supplier. 
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3.2. Problem description 
In this paper, we consider a SC producing and supplying a product to known markets. There are several other 
rivals in the markets supplying the same or different but substitutable products. The SC is competing with those 
rivals for market share. The product’s retail price in the markets depends on the total product quantity supplied 
by rivals to the markets. The potential demand in the markets is a function of the product’s retail price. 
Therefore, each rival directly selects its product supply quantity and indirectly selects the product’s retail price 
and potential demand in the markets such that its profit is maximized. Assuming that all rivals make decisions 
on their production quantities concurrently, we are able to find Nash equilibrium. In this paper, competition 
among rivals affects the following items: 
 Competition determines “amount of products that should be manufactured and supplied by each rival to 
the markets – so-called, its market share – and potential demand of product in the markets”. Potential 
demand in markets is usually assumed fixed in the literature.  
 Competition determines the “product’s retail price” in the markets as the product’s retail price depends 
on the total product supply to the markets. As expected, lower product supply to the markets after 
disruption leads to a higher retail price. The product price is usually considered an exogenous parameter 
in the previous studies in the literature.  
Therefore, our modelling has two parts: a) modelling competition among rivals to determine the 
equilibrium retail price, potential markets’ demands, and market shares (“Competition” part in Figure 1) that 
will be explained in Section 3.2; and b) developing a model to select the best risk mitigation strategies and 
designing the most profitable network for the SC (“Network Design” module in Figure 1) that will be done in 
Section 3.3. 
 
Figure 1. Two main components in the research problem. 
Network design and competition problems which are solved simultaneously are not independent; some 
important interactions between these two parts are as follows: 
 Information flow from “Network Design” module to “Competition” module: Availability of 
facilities, stocks, and capacity is determined by “Network Design” module and used by “Competition” 
module to determine the equilibrium product supply and retail price (see Figure 1).   
 Information flow from “Competition” module to “Network Design” module: The equilibrium 
product supply and retail price determined by “Competition” module is used by “Network Design” 
“Network Design” 
Design the most profitable network structure for the SC 
“Competition” 
Equilibrium retail price 
Availability of 
facilities, stocks, and 
capacity 
Equilibrium price and 
product supply 
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module to compute its capture-able income and profit (see Figure 1).  
In this paper, we study the importance of risk mitigation strategies on redesigning SCs to improve their 
competitive advantages. We want to determine what is the contribution of incorporating risk mitigation 
strategies in stabilizing 1) the SC’s profit; 2) its market share; and 3) retail price. 
4. MODELING AND SOLUTION 
Without loss of generality, we assume that this acyclic
2
 SC consists of multiple suppliers, one manufacturer and 
multiple retailers. Each retailer is for servicing one of the target markets. The set of all available suppliers 
which can be used by the SC is denoted by I, I = {i | i=1, 2, …, |𝐼|}. The manufacturer sources components 
from these suppliers and manufactures the final products. Then the products are shipped to retailers to serve 
markets. M is used to denote the set of available target markets to which products can be supplied, M = {m | 
m=1, 2, …, |𝑀|}.  
There are several rivals in the target markets offering the same product and competing to capture a higher 
market share. The set of existing rivals in the market m is denoted by 𝑅(𝑚). We assume that the demand of each 
potential market is elastic and decreasing in the retail price of the product. The quantity sold in the market m, 
𝑄𝑚, is defined as, 𝑄𝑚 = ∑
|𝑅𝑚|
𝑟=1 + 𝑞𝑚 where it is the sum of the quantities supplied by the rivals, ?̅?𝑟(∀𝑟 ∈
𝑅(𝑚)), and the quantity supplied by the SC, 𝑞𝑚. Moreover, the price of the product in the market m is a linear 
function of its supply quantity, 𝑄𝑚, shown as 𝑝𝑚 = 𝑎𝑚 − 𝑏𝑚𝑄𝑚. In this relation, 𝑎𝑚 is the maximum price at 
which the quantity of the product sold in market m is positive and 𝑏𝑚 is the price sensitivity parameter in 
market m. 
Suppliers might be subject to disruptions. In order to model disruptions, we define a path 𝑡𝑖𝑚 that starts 
from supplier i (∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼), goes via the manufacturer, and delivers the goods to the retailer of market m (∀𝑚 ∈
𝑀). This allows us to represent the SC’s potential network structure as a set of potential supply paths. Selecting 
the best network for the SC can be abstracted as selecting the best subset of these potential paths. For example, 
let us assume a SC (as depicted in Figure 2) characterized by six potential supply paths 
𝑇 = {𝑡11, 𝑡12, 𝑡21, 𝑡22, 𝑡31, 𝑡32}. The developed model will select the optimal subset of paths; let us assume it is 
the subset {𝑡11, 𝑡12, 𝑡21, 𝑡22}. This means that the best network structure includes suppliers 1 and 2 in the first 
echelon and target markets 1 and 2 in the last echelon. 
 
 
Figure 2. Potential paths in a sample SC. 
                                                          
2
 Such acyclic supply chain networks are common in the automobile and apparel industries (Majumder and Srinivasan, 
2008).  
qr
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
Suppliers                    Manufacturer                          Retailers         Markets 
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The concept of path helps us model any disruption regardless of its reason. The effect of any disruption in 
the production facilities, suppliers or in the transportation (i.e., connecting) links can be represented by a subset 
of potential paths which are operative. For example, in the sample SC of Figure 2 assume that disruption is 
possible in Supplier 2 and the connecting link of the manufacturer and Retailer 2 (𝑚𝑎𝑛 → 𝑟2) with  𝑃𝑟1 and 
 𝑃𝑟2 probabilities. In this case, four scenarios define the availabilities of this SC, 𝑆 = {𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠3, 𝑠4}. In 𝑠1, 
representing the unavailability of Supplier 2, only {𝑡11, 𝑡12, 𝑡31, 𝑡32} paths are available. The occurrence 
probability of this scenario, 𝑃𝑟𝑠1, is equal to 𝑃𝑟1(1 − 𝑃𝑟2). Scenario 𝑠2 represents the unavailability of link 
(𝑚𝑎𝑛 → 𝑟1) by considering {𝑡11, 𝑡21, 𝑡31} as the available paths with occurrence probability, 𝑃𝑟𝑠2, equal to 
𝑃𝑟2(1 − 𝑃𝑟1). In 𝑠3 only available paths are {𝑡11, 𝑡31} with 𝑃𝑟𝑠3 =  𝑃𝑟1𝑃𝑟2. 𝑠4 represents normal conditions 
when all paths are operative with occurrence probability equal to 𝑃𝑟𝑠4 =  1 −  𝑃𝑟1(1 − 𝑃𝑟2) − 𝑃𝑟2(1 − 𝑃𝑟1) −
 𝑃𝑟1𝑃𝑟2.  
We assume that availability of an unreliable facility in a sale period has a binomial distribution with a 
mean that is equal to 𝜃 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐷
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑇
 (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑇 shows the total number of former periods for which historical data is 
available and 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐷 shows the number of former periods in which the facility is not available).  
Therefore, if there is a SC with 𝑈𝑁 = {𝑢𝑛} unreliable facilities (production facilities or transportation 
links), the scenario set, 𝑆, for that chain would have 2|𝑈𝑁| = (
𝑈𝑁
0
) + (
𝑈𝑁
1
) + (
𝑈𝑁
2
) +⋯+ (
𝑈𝑁
𝑈𝑁 − 1
) +
(
𝑈𝑁
𝑈𝑁
) members. The first term of this series, (
𝑈𝑁
0
), shows the normal condition without any disrupted facility. 
The probability of this scenario is ∏ (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛)∀𝑢𝑛∈𝑈𝑁 . The second term of this series, (
𝑈𝑁
1
), includes all 
scenarios with only one disrupted facility. The probability of the scenario in which facility 𝑢𝑛 ∈ 𝑈𝑁 is 
disrupted is equal to 𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛 . ∏ (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑢?́?)∀𝑢?́?∈𝑈𝑁
𝑢?́?≠𝑢𝑛
. The third term of this series, (
𝑈𝑁
2
), includes all scenarios with 
two disrupted facilities. The probability of the scenario in which facilities 𝑢𝑛 and 𝑢?́? ∈ 𝑈𝑁 are disrupted is 
equal to 𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛. 𝑃𝑟𝑢?́?. ∏ (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛′′)∀𝑢𝑛′′∈𝑈𝑁
𝑢𝑛′′≠𝑢𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢?́?
. Finally, the last term, (
𝑈𝑁
𝑈𝑁
), shows the scenario in which all 
unreliable facilities are disrupted. The probability of this scenario is ∏ 𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛∀𝑢𝑛∈𝑈𝑁 .     
The set of all feasible paths in the SC is denoted by T, T = {𝑡𝑖𝑚 | 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 and 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀}. Any disruptions in the 
facilities or the links on the path would disrupt the entire path. We consider all the possible disruptions in the 
SC and associate a scenario to each combination of them. The set of all scenarios is denoted by S, S={s| s =1, 
2, …, |𝑆|}. The probability that each scenario will occur is denoted by  𝑃𝑟𝑠, s ∈ S. 
Three possible risk mitigation strategies are considered to neutralize the negative effects of disruptions. 
These strategies are reserving extra production capacity at the suppliers, multiple-souring, and keeping extra 
inventory or ‘emergency stock’ at the retailers. The main decisions addressed by the model can be categorized 
as strategic and tactical. Strategic decisions include which suppliers should be selected and what their optimal 
capacity should be. Moreover, the model should select the optimal markets to which the products are delivered 
so that the total profit is maximized. Tactical decisions deal with questions such as which routes should be used 
to meet the demand of each market and what is the share of each route in the total sales of each market? Should 
there be any emergency stocks held at retailers and what are the optimal levels? What are the optimal market 
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shares for the SC and its rivals, and what is the best selling price for the product in the market? A hierarchical 
decision-making process, which addresses first strategic and then tactical decisions, leads to sub-optimal 
solutions. This is because the efficiency of tactical decisions is affected by the network structure. The profit that 
can be achieved at the tactical stage depends on its network structure decided at the strategic level. 
Here we consider a single-sale period SCND problem. Multi-sale period production and storage planning 
is usually used for products for which the demand realization pattern significantly changes inside the planning 
period such as products with seasonal demands. Since in our case problem such a significant demand 
fluctuation is not expected, we consider a single-sale period as a representation of the whole planning period. 
When a link or a facility of a path is disrupted, this means the products moving on that path cannot be delivered 
on time to the retailer and it is very unlikely that disruption lasts more than a single-sale period.  
We use path concept based on cut-set theory -which is originated from reliability theory (Baghalian et al. 
(2013)- to formulate the models. Each path starts from a facility in the first echelon (a supplier in the case 
problem), passes through a facility in intermediate echelons (the manufacturer in the case problem), and finally 
ends at a facility in the last echelon (a retailer in the case problem). Therefore, the SC is represented as a set of 
paths. By changing the network structure of the SC, we only need to redefine “path” and update set. Therefore, 
the models of this paper are not restricted to SCs with a specific network structure and they can be applied for 
any SCs with any network structure. 
In the rest of this section, we first model a non-resilient network in which it is assumed that all facilities are 
always available. We then explore the possibility that some of the facilities will face disruption, and propose a 
resilient model using some risk mitigation strategies to hedge against such disruptions.  
4.1. Non-resilient and competitive SCND  
In this case, we ignore the possibility that there will be disruptions in the network. Therefore, there is only one 
scenario called “normal conditions”, 𝑆 = {𝑛}. With this assumption, we model the problem such that the total 
profit of the SC is maximized. The problem formulation is expressed as follows. 
Sets and indices 
I: Set of all available suppliers which can be used by SC, I = {i | i=1, 2, …, |𝐼|}; 
M: Set of target markets for supplying products of SC, M = {m | m=1, 2, …, |𝑀|}; 
T: Set of all potential paths in the potential network structure of the SC, T = {𝑡𝑖𝑚 | 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 and 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀}; 
𝑇(𝑖): Subset of paths of T started from supplier i, 𝑇(𝑖) ⊂ 𝑇;  
𝑇(𝑚): Subset of paths of T ended at market m, 𝑇(𝑚) ⊂ 𝑇;  
S: Set of all possible scenarios; 
𝑇(𝑠): Subset of paths of T which are usable in scenario s, 𝑇(𝑠) ⊂ 𝑇;  
𝑅(𝑚): Subset of existing rivals in market m, ?́? ∈ 𝑅(𝑚); 
𝐾𝑡
𝑠: Number of linear parts included in the linearized equilibrium profit and flow functions of path t in scenario 
s. 
Variables  
𝑣𝑖: 1 if supplier 𝑖 is selected by the SC, 0 otherwise (∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼); 
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?̅?𝑖: Production capacity of supplier i assigned to the SC (∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼);  
wm: 1 if target market m is selected to supply products in the SC; 0 otherwise (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀);  
𝑥𝑡
𝑠: Percentage of the SC’s capturable demand in market m that is supplied through path t in scenario s (∀𝑚 ∈
𝑀,∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑚, and ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆). Notice that if |𝑇(𝑚)| = 1, then 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 (𝑡 ∈ 𝑇(𝑚)) changes to a binary variable;  
𝑦𝑡
𝑠: 1 if inventory is kept in the corresponding retailer of path t in its inaccessibility scenarios; 0 otherwise 
(∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇(𝑠), ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆); 
𝑧𝑡: Amount of path t's product kept in its ending retailer for being used in case of disruption (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀); 
𝑝𝑚: Price of the SC’s product in market m (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀); 
𝑞𝑚: Amount of product supplied by the SC to market m (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀); 
?̅?𝑟: Amount of product supplied by existing rival r in market m (𝑟 ∈ 𝑅
(𝑚)); 
𝛼𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 : 1 if variable 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 accepts a value in the linear piece k of its piecewise linearized profit function; 0 otherwise 
(∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, 𝑘 = 1, 2, … , 𝐾𝑡
𝑠). Notice that ∑ 𝛼𝑡,𝑘
𝑠𝐾𝑡
𝑠
𝑘=1 = 𝑤𝑚 (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇
(𝑚), ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀); 
?́?𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 : 1 if variable 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 accepts a value in the linear piece k of its piecewise linearized flow function; 0 otherwise 
(∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, 𝑘 = 1, 2, … , 𝐾𝑡
𝑠). Notice that ∑ ?́?𝑡,𝑘
𝑠𝐾𝑡
𝑠
𝑘=1 = 𝑤𝑚 (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇
(𝑚), ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀); 
Parameters 
𝑘𝑖: Cost of unit capacity of supplier i assigned to the SC (∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼); 
𝐵𝑚: Fixed cost of locating a retailer in market m (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀); 
hm: Unit holding cost in retailer m along each period (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀); 
ct: Cost of producing and distributing unit along the path t (𝑖 → 𝑚), ct = a’i (unit production cost in the SC’s 
supplier) + dij (unit transportation cost from supplier i to manufacturer j) + b’ (unit production cost in the 
manufacturer) + dm (unit transportation cost from the manufacturer to retailer m) + c'm (unit handling cost in 
retailer of market m) (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇); 
cr: Cost of producing and distributing product unit by rival r in market m (𝑟 ∈ 𝑅
(𝑚), ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀);  
𝑒𝑡
𝑠: 1 if path t is usable in scenario s; 0 otherwise (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆); 
𝑃𝑟𝑠: Probability of scenario s (∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆); 
𝑎𝑚: Maximum price at which the quantity of the product sold in market m is positive (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀); 
𝑏𝑚: Price sensitivity parameter in market m; 
𝜃𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 : Constant term of 𝑘th linear piece in the linearized equilibrium profit function of path 𝑡 in scenario 𝑠 
(∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑘: 1,2, … , 𝐾𝑡
𝑠); 
𝜗𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 : Coefficient of 𝑘th linear piece in the linearized equilibrium profit function of path 𝑡 in scenario 𝑠 (∀𝑡 ∈
𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑘: 1,2,… , 𝐾𝑡
𝑠);  
𝛿𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 : Upper bound of 𝑘th linear piece in the linearized equilibrium profit function of path 𝑡 in scenario 𝑠 
(∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑘: 1,2, … , 𝐾𝑡
𝑠 − 1);  
?́?𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 : Constant term of 𝑘th linear piece in the linearized equilibrium flow function of path 𝑡 in scenario 𝑠 
(∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑘: 1,2, … , 𝐾𝑡
𝑠); 
?́?𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 : Coefficient of 𝑘th linear piece in the linearized equilibrium flow function of path 𝑡 in scenario 𝑠 (∀𝑡 ∈
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𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑘: 1,2,… , 𝐾𝑡
𝑠);  
?́?𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 : Upper bound of 𝑘th linear piece in the linearized equilibrium flow function of path 𝑡 in scenario 𝑠 (∀𝑡 ∈
𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑘: 1,2,… , 𝐾𝑡
𝑠 − 1);  
𝑀𝑎𝑥       𝑍 = ∑ ∑ (?̃?𝑚 − 𝑐𝑡)𝑥𝑡
𝑛?̃?𝑚
|𝑇(𝑚)|
𝑡=1
|𝑀|
𝑚=1 − ∑ (𝑘𝑖
|𝐼|
𝑖=1 ) − ∑ (𝐵𝑚𝑤𝑚)
|𝑀|
𝑚=1 − ∑ (𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑖
|𝐼|
𝑖=1 )                        (1) 
Subject to:  
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
𝑡=1 = 𝑤𝑚                                                   (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀)                                         (2) 
  ∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑛𝑞𝑚|𝑚∈𝑡
|𝑇(𝑖)|
𝑡=1 ≤                                            (∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼)                                             (3) 
𝑥𝑡
𝑛 ≤ 𝑣𝑖                                                                 (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇
(𝑖), ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼)                            (4) 
 𝑥𝑡
𝑛 ≤ 𝑤𝑚                                                              (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇
(𝑚), ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀)                      (5) 
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑡
𝑛 ≤ 1                                                          (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇)                                           (6) 
?̅?𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝑤𝑚 and 𝑣𝑖 ∈ {0,1}                             (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀,∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼)                            (7) 
The objective function (1) represents the SC’s total profit, which is the difference between the revenue 
generated by selling products in different markets and the total cost. 𝑥𝑡
𝑛 is the percentage of the SC’s demand in 
market m that is supplied via path t. ct is the cost of producing and distributing product unit along path t. 
Therefore, the total profit of the SC in market m through path t (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇(𝑚)) is equal to the multiplication of that 
path’s equilibrium profit in that market, ?̃?𝑚 − 𝑐𝑡, and the equilibrium amount of product sold via that path, 
𝑥𝑡
𝑛?̃?𝑚. The first term calculates the SC’s total profit as the sum of (?̃?𝑚 − 𝑐𝑡)𝑥𝑡
𝑛?̃?𝑚 over all available paths in all 
markets. The second term formulates the capacity cost of suppliers where ki is the unit capacity cost and ?̅?𝑖 
represents total reserved capacity in supplier 𝑖 (𝑖 ∈ 𝐼). The third term in (1) calculates the retailers’ location 
cost where Bm is the fixed cost of locating a retailer in market m and wm is a binary decision variable that is set 
to 1 if market m is selected to supply products and to 0 otherwise. The fourth term in (1) calculates the selected 
suppliers’ investment cost where Fi is the fixed investment cost of supplier i and 𝑣𝑖 is a binary decision variable 
that is set to 1 if supplier i is selected and to 0 otherwise. 
 Constraint (2) ensures that the paths leading to each market are activated only if there is a retailer located 
in that market. 𝑇(𝑚) is the subset of T including all the paths that end at market m, i.e. 𝑇(𝑚) = {𝑡𝑖𝑚 | ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼}. 
Constraint (3) dictates that the amount of flow from each supplier should be lower than the reserved capacity of 
that supplier, . 𝑇(𝑖) is the subset of T including all the paths originating from supplier i, i.e. 𝑇(𝑖) =
{𝑡𝑖𝑚 | ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀}. Constraints (4-5) ensure that facilities are located along the active paths of the SC. 
In Model (1-7), the equilibrium prices, ?̃?𝑚 (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀), and the equilibrium product supplies, ?̃?𝑚 (∀𝑚 ∈
𝑀), are not exogenous parameters and depend on the competition among rivals. In Section 3.2, we model 
competition among rivals in the markets to figure out how equilibrium prices and product supplies are functions 
of the SC’s operational and strategic level decisions.  
4.2. Equilibrium flow and price in competitive markets  
In this section, we determine the equilibrium supply, ?̃?𝑚 (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀), and retail price, ?̃?𝑚 (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀), used in 
equation (1) to compute the SC’s revenue. Each rival in the market chooses the quantity of products to produce 
such that its profit is maximized. As explained before in 𝑝𝑚 = 𝑎𝑚 − 𝑏𝑚𝑄𝑚 equation, the total amount of 
products delivered determines the retail price in the market, shared by all rivals. Therefore, the profit of the SC 
in market m in the normal conditions, 𝑠 = 𝑛, would be as follows:  
vi
vi
vi
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𝜋𝑚
𝑛 = (𝑎𝑚 − 𝑏𝑚 (∑ ?̅?𝑟
|𝑅(𝑚)|
𝑟=1 + 𝑞𝑚)) (𝑞𝑚) − ∑ 𝑐𝑡
|𝑇(𝑚)|
𝑡=1 𝑞𝑚𝑥𝑡
𝑛                                              (8) 
Assuming that all the market rivals make decisions concurrently on their production quantities, Nash 
equilibrium is used to model their competition. Results of the Nash equilibrium when the SC competes in 
market m with the rivals are indicated in Lemma 1. The proof of Lemma 1 is presented in the Appendix A. 
Lemma 1. The equilibrium supply and price of the SC in market m is given by 
?̃?𝑚 =
(𝑎𝑚 − ∑ 𝑐𝑡
|𝑇(𝑚)|
𝑡=1 𝑥𝑡
𝑛)
𝑏𝑚(1 + |𝑅
(𝑚)| + 𝑤𝑚)
⁄                         (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀)              (9) 
?̃?𝑚 =
(𝑎𝑚 + ∑ 𝑐𝑟
|𝑅(𝑚)|
𝑟=1 + ∑ 𝑐𝑡𝑥𝑡
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
𝑡=1 )
(1 + |𝑅(𝑚)| + 𝑤𝑚)
⁄         (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀)            (10) 
Now we substitute these results in the proposed mathematical model (1-7). With these substitutions, the 
objective function (1) changes as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥      ∑ [∑ (
𝑎𝑚+∑ 𝑐𝑟
|𝑅(𝑚)|
𝑟=1 +∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
(1+|𝑅(𝑚)|+𝑤𝑚)
− 𝑐𝑡)(
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(1+|𝑅
(𝑚)|+𝑤𝑚)
)𝑥𝑡
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
𝑡=1
|𝑀|
𝑚=1 − ∑ (𝑘𝑖
|𝐼|
𝑖=1 ) −
                 ∑ (𝐵𝑚𝑤𝑚) − ∑ (𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑖
|𝐼|
𝑖=1 )
|𝑀|
𝑚=1                                                                                                               (11) 
However, in equation (11), we can set 𝑤𝑚 = 1 in the denominators of both of the above fractions. It is because, 
in the case of 𝑤𝑚 = 0,  𝑥𝑡
𝑛, the variable representing all paths ending at market m (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇(𝑚)), would be zero 
due to equation (2) which makes the first term of (11) equal to zero. Therefore, this term is only positive if 
𝑤𝑚 = 1. The calculated equilibrium flow should also be substituted in constraint (3) of the mathematical 
model:  
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚|𝑚∈𝑡−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(1+|𝑅
(𝑚)|+𝑤𝑚)
)
|𝑇(𝑖)|
𝑡=1 ≤        (∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, m is a market at which path t ends)                 (12)   
With the same reasoning, we can set 𝑤𝑚 = 1 in the above constraint. The mathematical model of the problem 
in the non-resilient case would therefore be as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 ∑ [∑ (
𝑎𝑚+∑ 𝑐𝑟
|𝑅(𝑚)|
𝑟=1 +∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
(2+|𝑅(𝑚)|)
− 𝑐𝑡)(
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)𝑥𝑡
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
𝑡=1
|𝑀|
𝑚=1 − ∑ (𝑎𝑖
|𝐼|
𝑖=1 ) − ∑ (𝐵𝑚𝑤𝑚)
|𝑀|
𝑚=1 −
∑ (𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑖
|𝐼|
𝑖=1 )                                                                                                                                                          (13) 
Subject to: 
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)
|𝑇(𝑖)|
𝑡=1 ≤          (∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, m is a market at which path t ends)             (14) 
Constraints (2 and 4-7): Constraints 2 and 4-7 remain unchanged.                                     (15) 
By solving Model (13-15) and selecting the most profitable supply paths, variables 𝒙𝒕
𝒏, the equilibrium 
price and supply quantities are determined. Therefore, network design decisions, equilibrium supply and retail 
price decisions are made simultaneously by the model. 
4.3. Resilient and competitive SCND 
In this section, we develop a model of a resilient and competitive SCND. We define several scenarios 
vi
vi
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representing disruption possibilities in the links and facilities through the subsets of potential paths that are 
available to produce and supply products. To determine the availability of paths in the scenarios, we define a 
new binary parameter 𝑒𝑡
𝑠 (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆) which is set to 1 if path 𝑡 is available in scenario 𝑠 and to 0 
otherwise. In the rest of this section, we discuss the corollaries of incorporating risk mitigation strategies, 
Multiple-sourcing, reserving extra capacity and keeping emergency stock, in the mathematical model (13-15) to 
develop the model of designing resilient and competitive SCND.  
Model adjustment 1: Variable 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 represents the percentage of demand in the ending market of path t that 
is assigned to this path in scenario s (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆). To incorporate “multiple-sourcing” mitigation strategy, 
the variable assigning flows to paths should change to 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆) in the model. Adding the index s to 
this variable enables the model to use different paths and their associated facilities to meet market demands in 
various scenarios. Facilities through the paths substituting disrupted ones in a scenario are other sources to be 
used in the event of disruption. 
By adding “Multiple-sourcing” mitigation strategy, more facilities (such as suppliers) will be selected and 
consequently more investment cost will be imposed to the SC (fourth term in Equation (1) and fifth term in 
Equation (22) that will be explained later). 
Model adjustment 2: To incorporate “Emergency Stock” mitigation strategy, two new variables should be 
defined in the model namely 𝑦𝑡
𝑠 and 𝑧𝑡. 𝑦𝑡
𝑠 (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇) decide about the paths using emergency stock strategy in 
scenario 𝑠 (∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆); and 𝑧𝑡  (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇) determine the level of stock that should be kept for each path in its 
corresponding retailer. The following equations are required to control the values of these variables in the 
model: 
𝑥𝑡
𝑠 ≤ 𝑒𝑡
𝑠 + 𝑦𝑡
𝑠                                          (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)                                    (16) 
𝑦𝑡
𝑠 ≤ 1 − 𝑒𝑡
𝑠                                            (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)                                    (17) 
𝑧𝑡 ≥ (
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)𝑥𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑡
𝑠                   (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)                                    (18) 
Based on equation (16), each path can be used to supply product in a scenario, 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 > 0, either if that path is 
operative, 𝑒𝑡
𝑠 = 1, or that path is using emergency stock strategy, 𝑦𝑡
𝑠 = 1. Based on equation (17), using 
emergency stock is only possible in the scenarios in which the path is inoperative, 𝑒𝑡
𝑠 = 0. Equation (18) 
assures that emergency stock kept at each path should suffice to provide the path with the assigned flow in all 
of the scenarios in which 𝑦𝑡
𝑠 = 1.  
By adding “Emergency Stock” mitigation strategy, inventory holding cost will be imposed to the SC for 
unused stock (second term in Equation (22) that will be explained later).  
Model adjustment 3: To incorporate “Extra Reserved Capacity” mitigation strategy, the following 
equation should be added to the model:  
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠(1 − 𝑦𝑡
𝑠) (
𝑎𝑚|𝑚∈𝑡−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)
|𝑇(𝑖)|
𝑡=1 ≤            (∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼)                        (19) 
Based on equation (19), the capacity of each supplier should be enough to provide the required flows of all 
paths originating from that supplier without using emergency stock. Extra capacity can be reserved in some of 
the suppliers to compensate for the lack of capacity in other disrupted facilities. By only considering “normal 
vi
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conditions” and ignoring other scenarios, equation (19) should be revised as follows in order to exclude this 
mitigation strategy: 
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 (
𝑎𝑚|𝑚∈𝑡−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)
|𝑇(𝑖)|
𝑡=1 ≤ ?̅?𝑖                                                                 (∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼)                  (20) 
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠(1 − 𝑦𝑡
𝑠) (
𝑎𝑚|𝑚∈𝑡−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)
|𝑇(𝑖)|
𝑡=1 ≤ ∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 (
𝑎𝑚|𝑚∈𝑡−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)
|𝑇(𝑖)|
𝑡=1      (∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 − {𝑛})      (21) 
By adding “Extra Reserved Capacity” mitigation strategy, more capacity will be reserved in selected 
facilities and its corresponding cost will be increased in the objective function (second term in Equation (1) and 
third term in Equation (22) that will be explained later). 
In order to make the design of the SC network resilient to disruptions, the abovementioned model 
adjustments should be added to the non-robust and competitive SCND model (13-15). The mathematical model 
of the robust and competitive SCND problem will be as follows:  
Max         ∑ {∑ [∑ (
𝑎𝑚|𝑚∈𝑡+∑ 𝑐𝑟
|𝑅(𝑚)|
𝑟=1 +∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
(2+|𝑅(𝑚)|)
− 𝑐𝑡)(
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)
|𝑇(𝑚)|
𝑡=1 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 − ℎ𝑚 (𝑧𝑡 −
|𝑀|
𝑚=1
|𝑆|
𝑠=1
(
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)𝑥𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑡
𝑠)]}𝑝𝑟𝑠 − ∑ (𝑘𝑖
|𝐼|
𝑖=1 ) − ∑ (𝐵𝑚𝑤𝑚)
|𝑀|
𝑚=1 −∑ (𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑖
|𝐼|
𝑖=1 )                                               (22)  
Subject to: 
       𝑧𝑡 ≥ (
𝑎𝑚|𝑚∈𝑡−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)𝑥𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑡
𝑠                           (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)                                     (23) 
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠(1 − 𝑦𝑡
𝑠)(
𝑎𝑚|𝑚∈𝑡−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)
|𝑇(𝑖)|
𝑡=1 ≤ ?̅?𝑖       (∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼)                                      (24) 
𝑥𝑡
𝑠 ≤ 𝑒𝑡
𝑠 + 𝑦𝑡
𝑠                                                      (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)                                     (25) 
𝑦𝑡
𝑠 ≤ 1 − 𝑒𝑡
𝑠                                                        (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)                                     (26) 
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
𝑡=1 = 𝑤𝑚                                                  (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀,∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)                                  (27) 
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠|𝑆|
𝑠=1 ≤ 𝑣𝑖                                                        (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇
(𝑖), ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼)                                  (28) 
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠|𝑆|
𝑆=1 ≤ 𝑤𝑚                                                      (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇
(𝑚), ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀)                            (29) 
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 ≤ 1                                                           (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)                                    (30) 
𝑣𝑖, 𝑤𝑚, 𝑦𝑡
𝑠 ∈ {0,1}                                                 (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀,∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 , ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇)        (31) 
𝑧𝑡 , ?̅?𝑖 ≥ 0                                                              (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼)                                     (32) 
Similar to the previous non-resilient case, the first term of the objective function (22) calculates the 
expected value of the SC’s achievable profit over different scenarios. The second term in (22) captures the 
average inventory-related cost of unused emergency stock. The other terms in the objective function are similar 
to those in the earlier non-resilient case.  
4.4. SOLUTION APPROACH 
The proposed models in the previous section are mixed integer nonlinear (MIN) mathematical models. The 
vi
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main reason for this is the nonlinearity of the equilibrium flow of paths, (
𝑎𝑚|𝑚∈𝑡−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)𝑥𝑡
𝑠 (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈
𝑆). The equilibrium price is a linear term but when it is multiplied by the equilibrium flow in the objective 
function the objective function becomes strictly non-linear. The appearance of equilibrium flow in constraints 
(23) and (24) makes those constraints non-linear as well.  
Based on numerical analysis and as seen in Figure 3, depicting the profit function, first term in objective 
function (22), is either slightly concave or slightly convex. This specification of profit function derives us to 
substitute it with a piecewise linear function. There are two main strategies to solve real-scale MIN models: 1) 
solving exact model with approximating solution method; and 2) solving approximate model with exact 
solution method. Slight convexity or concavity of the profit function and high accuracy of its piecewise linear 
approximation, justifies the selection of the second strategy to solve these MIN models. 
 
Figure 3. A sample profit function and its three-part linear substitution. 
If we break the feasible range of 𝑥𝑡
𝑠, [0, 1], into a number of sections – say 𝐾𝑡
𝑠 – and approximate each 
section with a linear function, the approximate profit function would correspond to (for more detail see 
Appendix B): 
(
𝑎𝑚|𝑚∈𝑡+∑ 𝑐𝑟
|𝑅(𝑚)|
𝑟=1 +∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
(2+|𝑅(𝑚)|)
− 𝑐𝑡)(
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)𝑥𝑡
𝑠 =
                                  
{
 
 
 
𝜃𝑡,1
𝑠 + 𝜗𝑡,1
𝑠 𝑥𝑡
𝑠
𝜃𝑡,2
𝑠 + 𝜗𝑡,2
𝑠 𝑥𝑡
𝑠
…
 𝜃𝑡,𝐾𝑡𝑠
𝑠 + 𝜗𝑡,𝐾𝑡𝑠
𝑠 𝑥𝑡
𝑠
      
𝑖𝑓                 0 ≤ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 < 𝛿𝑡,1
𝑠
𝑖𝑓             𝛿𝑡,1
𝑠 ≤ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 < 𝛿𝑡,2
𝑠
…
𝑖𝑓           𝛿𝑡,𝐾𝑡𝑠−1
𝑠 ≤ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 < 1
        (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)                             (33) 
 
A similar approach is used to linearize the assigned equilibrium flow of the paths. Our numerical analysis 
shows the similar slight convexity and concavity in the equilibrium flows of the paths (see Figure 4). See 
Appendix C for more details. 
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Figure 4. Two sample path flows and their three-part linear substitutions. 
(Dark blue and light blue line indicates flow of first sample path. Green and red line indicate flow of second sample path)   
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
In this section, the various scenarios discussed earlier are analyzed using the data from the case company in 
order to extract the related insights. 
5.1. Case study analysis: SMAC company  
The potential network structure of the case study and its usable paths are shown in Figure 5. The cost of 
producing and selling through each path and the cost of product supplied by rival are summarized in Table 1. 
The annual fixed costs of locating a retailer in all the existing markets are the same and equal to 10. The cost of 
reserving one unit of capacity at any of the suppliers is 0.01. The inventory-related cost for each unit of product 
is 0.01.  
 
Figure 5. Potential network structure of SMAC for the manufacture of reverse idler gear shafts. 
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Table 1. Cost of producing unit product through potential paths. 
Retailer 1 Retailer 2 Retailer 3 Retailer 4 
𝑡11 1.85 𝑡12 1.80 𝑡13 1.80 𝑡24 1.65 
Rival 1.77 Rival 1.77 𝑡23 1.65 𝑡34 1.50 
- - -  Rival 1.70 Rival 1.70 
Retailer 5 Retailer 6 Retailer 7  
𝑡25 1.60 𝑡26 1.60 𝑡37 1.50   
𝑡35 1.50 𝑡36 1.50 Rival 1.55   
Rival 1.70 Rival 1.70 - -   
It is assumed that the first supplier is more costly than the others but 100% reliable. Supplier 2 is the next 
most expensive, but its production facilities might be out-of-order with 0.1 probability based on the historic 
data. The third supplier is the cheapest, but has the highest probability of disruption, which is 0.25. Thus four 
scenarios can be defined for this problem. First scenario represents normal conditions when all suppliers are 
available. The probability of the normal scenario is 1−(0.075+0.225+0.025) = 0.675. In the second and third 
scenarios, with the probability of 0.075 and 0.225 respectively, the second and third suppliers are disrupted. 
The fourth scenario considers disruptions in both second and third suppliers, and its probability of occurrence is 
0.25×0.1 = 0.025. In this setting, we assume that there is no probability of disruption in the connecting links of 
the SC. Incorporating such considerations into the model would only augment the number of scenarios. 
Regarding the price function of products in the markets, we assume that 𝑎𝑚 = 2 and 𝑏𝑚 = 2.5 × 10
−4 for all 
markets. 
The proposed models in the paper are mixed integer nonlinear (MIN) mathematical models with binary 
variables. The complexity and solution time of the models depends on the number of binary variables. In the 
models, there are |𝐼| + |𝑀| + |𝑆|. |𝑇| binary variables. In the case study problem, there are three potential 
suppliers, |𝐼| = 3, one manufacturer, and seven potential markets, |𝑀| = 7, with eleven potential paths, 
|𝑇| = 11. Also disruptions in the chain are modelled as four scenarios. Therefore, there are 54 binary variables 
in the models and solution time is a couple of seconds. We solve this model using CPLEX Concert Technology 
on a Dell laptop computer with Windows 10, Intel i7 processor, and 8 GB of installed RAM. Assuming that 
facilities (suppliers and markets) and disruption scenarios increase in the same proportions for higher number 
of manufacturers, by increasing the number of manufacturers up to 9 (≤
500
|𝐼|+|𝑀|+|𝑆|.|𝑇|=45
) the number of binary 
variables in the models stays less than 500. According to our experience, such MIN models with less than 500 
binary variables are easily solvable in a reasonable computational time (Rezapour et al., 2015).  
5.2. Implications and insights 
Implications of Creating Resilience for Supply Capability  
The first and second Research Questions (RQ1 and RQ2) that are going to be answered in this section are as 
follows: 
 RQ1: What is the effect of ignoring disruptions on the supply capability of the SC? 
 RQ2: How different risk mitigation strategies contribute to improving the supply capability of the SC?  
To answer these questions, first we solve the non-resilient model by ignoring the possible disruptions (first 
test problem). Obtaining these results helps us to evaluate the benefits of taking into account the possibility of 
disruptions in the model. The results of solving this model are visualized in Figure 6. Model does not find it 
profitable enough for the SC to establish a retailer to service the first market. 
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Figure 6. Network structure of SMAC in the first test problem. 
In this case, the profit of the SC in normal conditions is 665.26. However, when disruptions occur to the 
second, to the third or to both suppliers then {𝑡23}, {𝑡34, 𝑡35, 𝑡36, 𝑡37} and {𝑡23, 𝑡34, 𝑡35, 𝑡36, 𝑡37} path sets 
become inoperative. As a result its supply capability reduces by 14%, 78% and 92% respectively. These 
percentages are calculated based on the difference in supply quantity to the markets in the normal scenario 
compared with the other scenarios. This decreases the profit to 481.173, 76.98 and 15.11 respectively. This 
means that the SC’s long-term expected profit would reduce to 502.83, leaving aside the effects that poor 
service levels in the competitive markets would have on the reputation of the SC. 
In the next step, we solve the resilient model of the problem (second test problem). This model is a four-
scenario model incorporating all disruption possibilities concurrently and maximizes the average profit of the 
supply chains. Then once we have the optimal solution of this model, we can evaluate and find profit, price, 
market share, etc. under each scenario.    
In this problem, however, the disruption probability is incorporated into the model; the SC can use 
multiple-sourcing, reserving extra capacity and keeping emergency inventory at the retailers to mitigate the 
effects of disruptions and ensure a sustained supply of products to the markets. The results are visualized in 
Figure 7. As observed, in this case there is some extra capacity at the first supplier and there is some extra 
emergency stock, zt, at the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh retailers which are not used under normal conditions 
(Scenario 1) but, as will be explained later, are kept to be used in the event of disruption.  
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Figure 7. Network structure of SMAC in the second test problem (Scenario 1). 
It should be noted that qij is the quantity of product flow through the path originating from supplier i and 
ending at retailer j. Figure 8 represents the product flow in the network of the resilient SC in the second 
scenario in which supplier 2 is disrupted. In this case, supplier 1 is substituted for supplier 2 and its extra 
capacity is used on path t13 to supply products to market 3. Due to “extra capacity” mitigation strategy, the 
supply capability of the SC only reduces 5.6% in comparison to the normal condition. The supply capability of 
the resilient SC in scenario 2 is 8.4% higher than the non-resilient SC’s.  
 
Figure 8. Product flow in the resilient SC in the second scenario. 
Figure 9 represents the product flow in the network of the resilient SC in the third scenario in which 
supplier 3 is inoperative. In this case, all the supply paths originating from the third supplier, serving the 
markets 4, 5, 6 and 7, are unavailable. So the SC uses the extra inventory kept at the retailers to compensate for 
the disrupted supplier. Due to emergency stock mitigation strategy, the supply capability of SC does not change 
in the third scenario in comparison to the normal conditions (scenario 1). The supply capability of the resilient 
SC in scenario 3 is 78% higher than that of the non-resilient SC. 
𝑞12 = 266.67 
𝑞23 = 463.14 
3 
1 
2 
𝑞34 = 663.14 
𝑞35 = 664.32 
𝑞36 = 664.32 
𝑞37 = 666.66 
?́?1 = 536.80 
?́?2 = 471.34 
?́?3 = 2658.44 
𝑣𝑡34 = 663.14 
𝑣𝑡35 = 664.32 
𝑣𝑡36 = 664.32 
2 
5 
7 
4 
6 
3 
𝑣𝑡37 = 666.66 
Suppliers         Manufacturer                        Retailers 
𝑞12 = 266.67 
𝑞13 = 270.13 
3 
1 
2 𝑞34 = 663.14 
𝑞35 = 664.32 
𝑞36 = 664.32 
𝑞37 = 666.66 
?́?1 = 536.80 
?́?2 = 471.34 
?́?3 = 2658.44 
𝑣𝑡34 = 663.14 
𝑣𝑡35 = 664.32 
𝑣𝑡36 = 664.32 
𝑣𝑡37 = 666.66 
2 
5 
7 
4 
6 
3 
Suppliers         Manufacturer                        Retailers 
20 
 
 
Figure 9. Product flow in the resilient SC in the third scenario. 
Figure 10 illustrates the product flow in the network of the resilient SC in scenario 4 in which both 
suppliers 2 and 3 are inoperative. In this case, the extra capacity of supplier 1 and the inventories at retailers are 
used to fulfil the demands of markets 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Supply quantities to the markets in Figure 10 show that 
the supply capability of the resilient SC in scenario 4 is 86% higher than that of the non-resilient SC. The share 
of the “Emergency stock” and “Extra Capacity” in this supply capability improvement is 90.8% and 9.2% 
respectively.  
 
Figure 10. Product flow in the resilient SC in the fourth scenario. 
By considering the probability of the scenarios, we conclude that:  
 The average supply capability of the resilient SC is ~20.34% higher than the non-resilient 
SC. The average share of “Emergency stock” and “Extra Capacity” in this improvement is 
~15.255% and ~5. 085% respectively.   
 
Supply quantity of the SC in the resilient and non-resilient cases and in the event of different disruption 
scenarios is shown in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Comparison of the SC’s supply quantity in the resilient and non-resilient cases. 
Resilient 
SC 
Supply Mean supply Standard deviation of supply The worst case supply 
Scenario 1 3388.25 
3368.95 7.61 3195.24 
Scenario 2 3195.24 
Scenario 3 3388.25 
Scenario 4 3195.24 
Non-
resilient SC 
Scenario 1 3388.25 
2677.32 34.05 266.67 
Scenario 2 2925.11 
Scenario 3 729.81 
Scenario 4 266.67 
Improvement ~26% ~447% ~1198% 
 
The results summarized in Table 2 show that equipping the SCs with risk mitigation strategies to make 
them resilient improves their average supply capability and reduces the standard deviation of supply. This, 
essentially, means that there is a tradeoff between SCs’ average supply capability and the standard deviation of 
their supply. We can increase the resilience of a SC by adding more risk mitigation strategies. Higher resilience 
means higher average and lower standard deviation for the SC’s supply quantity.  
Implications of Creating Resilience for the SC profit  
In this section we answer the third research question (RQ3): What is the effect of ignoring disruptions on the SC 
profit? 
In the resilient case, the profit of the SC in the normal conditions is 638.67, lower than the profit of the 
non-resilient model which was 665.263. This difference can be considered as the resilience cost to the SC, 
given that risk mitigation strategies inevitably impose some costs on the system. However, it should be noted 
that in the event of disruption to the second, third or both of these suppliers, the profit of the SC could be kept 
at 576.8, 665.2 and 603.39 respectively. The standard deviation of the SC profit in the resilient model is 4.67 
but for the non-resilient model it is 314.51. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the average profit of the resilient SC is ~27% better than the non-resilient SC. 
Being resilient reduces the standard deviation of the SC’s profit by ~341% and improves the SC’s worst case 
profit ~38 fold.   
Based on the results summarized in Table 3, we conclude: 
The average profit of the resilient SC is ~27% higher than the non-resilient SC.  
 
Table 3. Comparison of the SC’s profit in the resilient and non-resilient cases. 
Resilient 
model 
Profit Mean Profit Standard deviation of profit The worst case profit 
Scenario 1 638.67 
639.11 4.67 576.80 
Scenario 2 576.80 
Scenario 3 665.26 
Scenario 4 603.39 
Non-
resilient 
model 
Scenario 1 665.26 
502.83 15.94 15.11 
Scenario 2 481.17 
Scenario 3 76.98 
Scenario 4 15.11 
Improvement ~27% ~341% ~3817% 
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Incorporating risk mitigation strategies improves the supply capability of SCs in the event of disruption. 
Higher supply to markets results in an enhanced service to customers that leads to higher income. However, 
incorporating risk mitigation strategies comes at a cost. Therefore, a tradeoff should be established between the 
cost of creating resiliency and its revenue. The model developed in this paper helps us to find the best tradeoff 
between the cost and revenue of resilience in a SC in a way to maximize its profit. In the case problem, the 
most profitable compromise happens when enough risk mitigation strategies are added to the SC and the 
average supply reduction in disruptions decreases to 26%.      
Implications of Creating Resilience for the Market Prices and Shares   
In this section, we compare the market share and the retail price in different markets in the resilient and non-
resilient models. The results are summarized in Table 4 and displayed in Figures 11 and 12. The values 
presented in this table corresponding to retail price and market share are calculated as follows: 
 Retail price in the resilient case: to compute the retail price in each market and in each scenario, first we 
solve the model formulated in 22-32 for the case problem and find optimal values for 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 (∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, ∀𝑚 ∈
𝑀,∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇(𝑚)). By substituting these variables in 
𝑎𝑚+∑ 𝑐𝑟
|𝑅(𝑚)|
𝑟=1 +∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
(2+|𝑅(𝑚)|)
 (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 and ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆), we 
compute equilibrium retail price in each market and in each scenario.   
 Market share of SMAC in the resilient case: to compute the market share of SMAC in each market and 
in each scenario, first we solve the model formulated in 22-32 for the case problem and find optimal 
values for 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 (∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀,∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇(𝑚)). By substituting these variables in 
∑ (
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
) . 𝑥𝑡
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
𝑡=1 , the supply quantity of SMAC to market m (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀) in scenario s (∀𝑠 ∈
𝑆) is computed. Equation (
𝑎𝑚−𝑐𝑟
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
) (∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅(𝑚) and ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀) determines the supply quantity of 
rival r (∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅(𝑚) and ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀) to market m. Therefore, the market share of SMAC in market m 
(∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀) and in scenario s (∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆) is computed as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐶 =
∑ (
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
).𝑥𝑡
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
𝑡=1
∑ (
𝑎𝑚−𝑐𝑟
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)
|𝑅(𝑚)|
𝑟=1 +∑ (
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
).𝑥𝑡
𝑠
|𝑇(𝑚)|
𝑡=1
            
The market share of rival r (∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅(𝑚)) in market m (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀) and in scenario s (∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆) is computed 
as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑚 =
(
𝑎𝑚−𝑐𝑟
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)
∑ (
𝑎𝑚−𝑐𝑟
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)
|𝑅(𝑚)|
𝑟=1 +∑ (
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑠|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
).𝑥𝑡
𝑠
|𝑇(𝑚)|
𝑡=1
  
 Market share of SMAC in the non-resilient case: to compute market share of SMAC in each market and 
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in each scenario, first we solve the model formulated in 13-15 and find optimal values for 𝑥𝑡
𝑛 (∀𝑚 ∈
𝑀,∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇(𝑚)). By substituting these variables in ∑ (
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
) . 𝑥𝑡
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
𝑡=1 . (1 − 𝑒𝑡
𝑠), the supply 
quantity of SMAC to market m (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀) in scenario s (∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆) ,𝑞𝑚
𝑠 , is computed. Then the market 
shares of SMAC and its competitors can be calculated following a logic similar to the non-resilient case.  
 Retail price in the non-resilient case: after computing 𝑞𝑚
𝑠  values, the retail price in market m (∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀) 
and in scenario s (∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆), 𝑝𝑚
𝑠 , is computed as follows: 
𝑝𝑚
𝑠 = 𝑎𝑚 − 𝑏𝑚 (𝑞𝑚
𝑠 + ∑ (
𝑎𝑚−𝑐𝑟
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)
|𝑅(𝑚)|
𝑟=1 )  
As can be seen, a resilient SC is always able to capture a larger market share than a non-resilient one. 
Apparently, the mitigation strategies help the SC to stabilize its supply quantities. This not only leads to higher 
profit but also in the long run positively affects the reputation of the company and improves competitiveness. 
Table 4. Market share and retail prices in the markets. 
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2 
1 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 
2 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 
3 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 
4 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 
Avg. 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 
3 
1 1.783 466.67 .53 400 .47 1.783 466.67 .53 400.00 .47 
2 1.833 266.67 .40 400 .60 1.850 0 .00 600.00 1.0 
3 1.783 466.67 .53 400 .47 1.783 466.67 .53 400.00 .47 
4 1.833 266.67 .40 400 .60 1.850 0 .00 600.00 1.0 
Avg. 1.789 441.67 .53 400 .47 1.791 408.33 .49 425.00 .51 
4 
1 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 
2 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 
3 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.85 0 .00 600 1.0 
4 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.85 0 .00 600 1.0 
Avg. 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.765 483.33 .45 455 .55 
5 
1 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 
2 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 
3 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.850 0 .00 600 1.0 
4 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.850 0 .00 600 1.0 
Avg. 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.765 483.33 .45 455 .55 
6 
1 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 
2 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 
3 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.850 0 .00 600 1.0 
4 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.850 0 .00 600 1.0 
Avg. 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.765 483.33 .45 455 .55 
7 
1 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 
2 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 
3 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 1.775 0 .00 900 1.0 
4 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 1.775 0 .00 900 1.0 
Avg. 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 1.708 483.33 .38 537.5 .62 
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It is interesting to note that a steady supply of a product by the resilient SC stabilizes the retail price of that 
product in the market. As seen in Table 2, fluctuations in the retail price of the product are much greater in the 
non-resilient SC than in the resilient one. Analyzing the results of Table 3 answers the questions regarding the 
effect of ignoring disruptions on the market shares and price as follows: 
The market share stability of the resilient SC is ~33.5 percent higher than the stability of 
the non-resilient SC without mitigation strategies.  
The price stability of the resilient SC is ~6.7 percent higher than that of the SC without 
mitigation strategies. 
 
 
Figure 11. Market shares of resilient and non-resilient SCs
3
. 
 
Figure 12. Retail prices of resilient and non-resilient SCs. 
Contribution of Risk Mitigation Strategies to the SC Profit 
In order to gain insights on the value of mitigation strategies, we develop another model in which no 
emergency stock is held. For this, variables 𝑦𝑡
𝑠 and 𝑧𝑡 are removed from the problem formulation and the term 
relating to holding cost is also deleted from the objective function. In this case, it is not required to have (23) to 
                                                          
3
 Only one potential path ends at Market 7 represented by 𝑡37. This path originates from the third supplier. So in the third 
and fourth scenarios when the third supplier is out-of-use, the SC completely losses its market share in Market 7. 
Therefore, as seen in Figure 11, the SC’s average market share is low in Market 7 in the non-resilient case. Moreover, the 
cost of producing and distributing product unit by Market 7’s rival ($1.55) is very low in comparison with other markets’ 
rivals (for example it is $1.7 for Markets 4, 5, and 6). Therefore, as seen in Figure 12, the equilibrium retail price is lower 
in Market 7 in comparison with other markets.      
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take care of the level of emergency stock at the retailer or (26) to allow the usage of emergency stock once 
disruption occurs. Also 𝑦𝑡
𝑠 should be set equal to 0 in (24). The results related to profit  of the results from 
solving this simpler model are summarized in Table 5.  
Table 5. Comparison of resilient models with and without emergency stock. 
Strategy Profit Mean profit 
Standard deviation 
of profit 
Worst case  
profit 
Resilient model 
with emergency 
stock 
Scenario 1 638.67 
639.11 4.67 576.80 
Scenario 2 576.80 
Scenario 3 665.26 
Scenario 4 603.39 
Resilient model 
without 
emergency stock 
Scenario 1 665.2630 
569.86 12.75 15.11 
Scenario 2 603.3930 
Scenario 3 334.1341 
Scenario 4 15.11000 
 
As seen in this table, removing the extra inventory strategy improves the profitability of the SC in scenario 
1. It is an intuitive finding since the cost of holding inventory is removed from the profit function. However, in 
the other scenarios, such as 3 and 4 in which a more economical supplier is unavailable, the profit decreases 
significantly. Lack of extra inventory and the unavailability of two suppliers in scenario 4 limit the supply 
capability of the SC. Consequently, the expected profit of the simple model decreases and the standard 
deviation of profit in different scenarios increases significantly. As shown in the final column of Table 5, the 
worst-case profit in this simpler version of the resilient model is markedly lower than the worst-case profit of 
the original resilient model which contained all contingency strategies. This result highlights the importance of 
the emergency stock as a powerful risk mitigation strategy. The profits in Tables 3 and 5 are compared to 
determine the contribution of risk mitigation strategies in improving the profitability of the resilient SC as 
follows: 
The average profit of the resilient SC is ~27% higher than the non-resilient SC. The share 
of “Emergency Stock” and “Extra Capacity” in this profit improvement is ~50% for both 
strategies.  
 
Because of the higher share of “Emergency Stock” in the supply capability of the SC, clearly this strategy 
is more costly than the “Extra Capacity” strategy. The roles of these strategies in reducing profit variation and 
improving worst-case profit of the case problem are stated as follows: 
The share of “Emergency Stock” and “Extra Capacity” in reducing the profit variation is 
~72% and ~28% respectively.  
The share of “Emergency Stock” and “Extra Capacity” in improving the SC worst case 
profit is ~100% and ~0% respectively.  
 
Detailed results showing the performance of the SC in different scenarios are presented in Figures 13-15. 
Figure 13 represents the flow in the SC in the first scenario when there is no disruption. The only difference 
between this figure and that showing the resilient model (Figure 3) is in the reserved capacity of the second 
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supplier. Intuitively, where there are fewer mitigation policies in place, the results from this model indicate that 
more capacity should be reserved at the second supplier in order to hedge against disruption and compensate 
for the unavailability of the third supplier. The network flows of the two models are almost similar. The main 
difference between the results of these two models is in the third and fourth scenarios. 
 
Figure 13. Network structure of SMAC according to the normal conditions (scenario 1) when no emergency stock is held. 
Figure 14 represents the network flow in the third scenario in which the most cost-effective supplier is out 
of reach. Here, in the resilient model, the model uses the emergency stock strategy to fulfil the demand of 
markets 4, 5, 6, 7 (Figure 9). But in the simplified resilient model this strategy is removed. So the model has to 
use a more expensive strategy – extra capacity reservation at the second supplier – to fulfil the demand of these 
markets. Extra cost leads to higher retail prices in these markets and reduces the market share (Table 6).  
 
 
Figure 14. Network flow in scenario 3 when no emergency stock is held. 
Figure 15 represents the network flow in scenario 4 in which the second and third suppliers are 
unavailable. In this case, there are no resources to supply the demand of the markets and therefore the demands 
of the fourth, fifth and sixth markets cannot be met. Consequently, this leads to a sharp drop in market shares 
(Table 6) and profit (Table 5). 
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Figure 15. Network flow in scenario 4 when no emergency stock is held. 
Table 6. Market share and retail prices in resilient models with and without emergency stock. 
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2 
1 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 
2 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 
3 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 
4 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 
Ave. 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 1.850 266.66 .47 306.66 .53 
3 
1 1.783 466.67 .53 400 .47 1.783 466.67 .53 400 .47 
2 1.833 266.67 .40 400 .60 1.833 266.67 .40 400 .60 
3 1.783 466.67 .53 400 .47 1.783 466.67 .53 400 .47 
4 1.833 266.67 .40 400 .60 1.833 266.67 .40 400 .60 
Ave. 1.789 441.67 .53 400 .47 1.789 441.67 .53 400 .47 
4 
1 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 
2 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 
3 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.783 466.67 .53 400 .47 
4 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.85 0 .00 600 1.0 
Ave. 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.748 600.00 .58 405 .41 
5 
1 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 
2 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 
3 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.766 533.33 .57 400 .43 
4 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.850 0 .00 600 1.0 
Ave. 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.744 616.66 .59 405 .40 
6 
1 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 
2 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 
3 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.766 533.33 .57 400 .43 
4 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.85 0 .00 600 1.0 
Ave. 1.733 666.67 .62 400 .38 1.744 616.66 .59 405 .40 
7 
1 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 
2 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 
3 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 1.775 0 .00 900 1.0 
4 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 1.775 0 .00 900 1.0 
Ave. 1.683 666.67 .53 600 .47 1.708 483.33 .38 537.5 .62 
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Contribution of Risk Mitigation Strategies to the Price Stability in the Markets 
In Table 6, equilibrium prices in the markets and the market shares in the resilient model with no emergency 
stock compared with those in the resilient model with emergency stock are summarized. As intuition suggests, 
not having emergency stock leads to reduction in the SC’s supply capability and increases the rivals’ market 
share. 
Risk mitigation strategies enables the SC to provide a steady flow of product to the markets in all 
situations. Total product supply to each market is the critical factor determining the equilibrium product price 
in that market. Therefore risk mitigation strategies have a key role in stabilizing prices in the markets. In this 
section, we use the results summarized in Tables 4 and 6 to analyze the contributions of risk mitigation 
strategies in stabilizing market prices. Figure 17 displays the equilibrium market price dispersion in four 
scenarios and three cases: i) without risk mitigation strategies; ii) with only “extra capacity” strategy; and iii) 
with both “extra capacity” and “emergency stock” strategies. 
 
Figure 17. Contribution of risk mitigation strategies in stabilizing markets’ prices.  
Based on these results, we conclude that: 
 Adding “extra capacity” strategy, decreases price dispersion 0 percent in the second and seventh market, 
100 percent in the third market, 28 percent in the fourth, fifth and sixth markets. Therefore, this strategy 
can stabilize markets’ prices up to 30.7 percent in average. 
 After adding “emergency stock” strategy to the SC with “extra capacity” strategy, price dispersion in the 
markets reduces 0 percent in the second and third markets, 72 percent in the fourth, fifth and sixth 
markets, and 100 percent in the seventh market. So this strategy helps to stabilize the market prices up to 
52.7 percent in average. 
 If both risk mitigation strategies are incorporated in the SC, then the price stability is 3.7 times higher 
than stability in the markets of the SC without mitigation strategies. In this market stabilization, the 
contribution of “emergency stock” strategy (72 percent) is 2.57 times as much as that of “extra capacity” 
(28 percent).  
Contributions of Risk Mitigation Strategies to the Stability of the market shares 
Risk mitigation strategies increase the product supply capability and help it to retain its shares in the markets in 
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all situations. This constant presence in the markets even in the event of disruptions stabilizes the position of 
SC, helps it to keep its customers and make long-term relationships with them, and improves its brand 
reputation. All these characteristic positively affect the profitability of the SC in the long term. In this section, 
we use the results summarized in Tables 4 and 6 to analyze the contributions of risk mitigation strategies in 
stabilizing SC market shares. Figure 18 displays the SC market shares in four scenarios in three cases: i) 
without risk mitigation strategies; ii) with only “extra capacity” strategy; and iii) with both “extra capacity” and 
“emergency stock” strategies. 
 
Figure 18. Contribution of risk mitigation strategies in stabilizing SC’s market shares.  
Based on these results, we conclude that: 
 Adding “extra capacity” strategy decreases market share variation 0 percent in the second and seventh 
market, 100 percent in the third market, 40 percent in the fourth, fifth, and sixth markets. Thus this 
strategy can stabilize the position of the SC in the markets 36.1 percent in average. 
 After adding “emergency stock” strategy to the SC with “extra capacity” strategy, the market share 
dispersion reduces 0 percent in the second and third markets, 60 percent in the fourth, fifth, and sixth 
markets, and 100 percent in the seventh markets. Therefore, this strategy helps to stabilize the SC share in 
the markets about 47.1 percent in average. 
 The market share stability with both risk mitigation strategies is 13.5 times higher than that of the model 
without mitigation strategies. In this market share retention, the contribution of “emergency stock” 
strategy is 1.5 times as much as that of “extra capacity” in most of the markets.  
Prioritization of the Risk Mitigation Strategies 
In the scenarios and in the markets in which both risk mitigation strategies are applicable, their priority in 
selection depends on their costs (unit inventory holding cost for “emergency stock” strategy and cost of unit 
capacity for “extra capacity” strategy). To determine this dependency, we solve the model for different values 
of inventory holding cost and capacity cost. The results of strategy selection are displayed in Figure 19. Based 
on these results, the space representing (𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) combinations can be divided into 
three regions: 
 Region I: In this region, the inventory cost is significantly higher than the capacity cost (in the case 
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problem 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 ≳ 0.052 + 0.8 × 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡). Therefore, only “extra capacity” risk 
mitigation strategy is selected by the model to counter the negative impacts of disruptions.  
 Region II: In this region, the capacity cost is significantly higher than the inventory cost (in the case 
problem 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 ≲ 0.01 + 0.75 × 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡). Therefore, only “emergency stock” risk 
mitigation strategy is selected by the model to counter the negative impacts of disruptions.   
 Region III: In this region, the model decides to have a combination of both policies. Therefore, the 
network keeps emergency stock besides reserving extra capacity to counter the negative impacts of 
disruption.     
 
Figure 19. Prioritization of risk mitigation strategies with respect to different inventory and capacity costs. 
Generalizing the outputs of the case problem, leads to the following insights:  
 If all the potential supply paths ending at a competitive market are unreliable, then holding downstream 
“emergency stock” is the most preferable risk mitigation strategy. Keeping emergency stock becomes more 
appealing as the number of target markets increases. 
 Moreover, if at least one reliable path exists among the potential supply paths servicing a competitive 
market, then the most preferable risk mitigation strategy is the most economic (least costly) one. Increasing 
the number of target markets, further highlights the importance of the most economic risk management 
strategy. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper aims to address the design of a resilient SC network that is susceptible to two major risks namely a 
tough competition in the market and unreliability of suppliers. There are several practical cases in the literature 
indicating that in today’s highly competitive markets any failure to fulfil customer demand is not tolerated and 
results in loss of market share. However, with globalization, the number of suppliers has increased dramatically 
leading to a far more complex environment and the chances that suppliers will face disruption have also risen. 
Therefore, companies need to plan ahead and consider what risk mitigation strategies they can use if a supplier 
experiences disruption. Using these mitigation strategies firms or the SCs can recover quickly from such 
(Region I) 
(Region III) 
(Region II) 
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disruption. To this end, the notion of a resilient SC has been developed. SC resilience is built on the idea that 
firms need to create redundancy and flexibility that can be brought into play if a disruption occurs. Several risk 
mitigation strategies are proposed, and the most popular ones in practice include keeping extra emergency 
stock, reserving extra capacity at suppliers, and multiple-sourcing. 
In this paper, we incorporate these strategies in the design stage of the SC and investigate how these policies 
work to the advantage of SCs. Firms might be reluctant to implement these policies since they are considered 
costly. In this paper, we show that such policies, even though costly, help to ensure that companies can 
maintain their market share even when faced with disruption. What is also noteworthy is that such strategies not 
only work to the advantage of the company but their customers also benefit from them. Thoughtfully 
incorporating such risk mitigation policies results in price reduction that customers can enjoy. This is mainly 
because, with these strategies in place, SCs can avoid product scarcity and can keep on competing with rivals if 
disruption occurs. 
Moreover, using a controlled experimental setting through studying the impact of risk mitigation strategies 
and cost parameters, we are able to draw insights on the performance of these risk strategies. We are able to 
identify under different structures how these strategies perform with respect to profit, stability of the market 
price and also market share. Our findings show that creating resiliency boosts average supply capability, profit, 
and market share of SCs. However, the cost of implementing mitigation strategies may lead to profit reduction 
if no disruption occurs. The model we developed in this paper captures this trade-off and helps to compromise 
these two aspects. Also we show that resilience of SCs stabilizes retail prices in competitive markets and 
reduces their fluctuations in the event of disruptions. The contribution of risk mitigation strategies, “keeping 
strategic stock” and “reserving extra capacity”, in the stabilizations of a SC’s market share and markets’ prices 
depends on the: I) SC’s network structure and II) cost components of the risk mitigation strategies. If all the 
potential supply paths of the SC ending at a competitive market are unreliable, then holding downstream 
“emergency stock” is the most preferable risk mitigation strategy. Moreover, if at least one reliable path exists 
among the potential supply paths servicing a competitive market, then the most preferable risk mitigation 
strategy is the most economic (least costly) one.  
APPENDIX A 
Proof of Lemma 1: First assume that there are N rivals competing in a market, m. Production price for each 
rival is 𝑐𝑖, (𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑁). Production quantity of each rival is and retail price of product in the market is pm. 
Thus the profit for rival i is  
                                                       (34) 
We differentiate this profit function over production quantity . Using the first order condition, we have:  
                                                                        (35) 
Additionally, the second order condition of this function is 
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                                                                                                       (36) 
It is obvious that profit function has a unique optimal solution shown as . If we set the first order derivatives 
to zero we have 
                                                                      (37) 
If we add up these N equalities we have 
                                                                                                          (38) 
Substituting  into (8) we have 
                                                                                                           (39) 
N in the denominator of (38) and (39) represents the number of rivals in that market. In our problem one of 
these rivals is the new chain for which production cost is ∑ 𝑐𝑡
|𝑇(𝑚)|
𝑡=1 𝑥𝑡
𝑛 (based on Equation 9). In our problem 
the number of each market's rivals is equal to 𝑁 = |𝑅(𝑚)| + 𝑤𝑚. Substituting these equations in (38) results 
(10). By following the same approach we can easily derive Equation (11) from Equation (39). 
APPENDIX B 
Notice that non-linear revenue and product flow occur in the retailers at which two or more paths end. If only 
one path ends at the retailer then the variable governing the assignment of flow to the path, 𝒙𝒕
𝒔, converts to a 
binary variable that takes 1 when the path is active and 0 otherwise. Linearization of the multiplication of two 
binary variables is not a cumbersome task. The situation becomes problematic when more than two paths end at 
a retailer and it needs to be decided how to divide the order quantity originating from the retailer among these 
paths. In other words, the problem occurs when the variable 𝒙𝒓
𝒔 corresponding to these paths can take any value 
in [0, 1]. Multiplying two continuous variables leads to non-linear terms in the objective function and 
constraints. To clarify the issue further, consider a retailer m that lies at the end of two paths. The unit 
production and distribution costs in the first and second paths are 1.65 and 1.5, respectively. In this case the 
profit generated by this retailer in a given scenario, s, can be formulated as follows: 
(
𝑎𝑚+∑ 𝑐𝑟
|𝑅(𝑚)|
𝑟=1 +(1.65𝑥1
𝑠+1.5𝑥2
𝑠)
(2+|𝑅(𝑚)|)
− 1.65)(
𝑎𝑚−(1.65𝑥1
𝑠+1.5𝑥2
𝑠)
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
) 𝑥1
𝑠 +  
(
𝑎𝑚+∑ 𝑐𝑟
|𝑅(𝑚)|
𝑟=1 +(1.65𝑥1
𝑠+1.5𝑥2
𝑠)
(2+|𝑅(𝑚)|)
− 1.50)(
𝑎𝑚−(1.65𝑥1
𝑠+1.5𝑥2
𝑠)
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
) 𝑥2
𝑠                                     (40) 
This function is depicted in Figure 3 with respect to 𝑥1
𝑠 (𝑥2
𝑠 = 1-𝑥1
𝑠). As observed, the captured profit is a strictly 
decreasing function. In our numerical analysis we observe that the profit function is either slightly concave or 
slightly convex. This specification of profit function derives us to substitute it with a piecewise linear function. 
If we break the range [0, 1] into a number of sections – say three – the resulting three-piece linear function, an 
approximation of (40), would correspond to Equation 41 (Figure 3). Increasing the number of parts in the linear 
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function improves its approximation. But dividing the range should be discontinued once the approximation 
seems acceptable. 
{
155.20 − 106.73 𝑥1
𝑠      if     0.00 ≤ 𝑥1
𝑠 ≤ 0.33    or    0.66 ≤ 𝑥2
𝑠 ≤ 1.00
150.84 − 93.530𝑥1
𝑠      if    0.33 ≤ 𝑥1
𝑠 ≤ 0.66     or    0.33 ≤ 𝑥2
𝑠 ≤ 0.66
141.98 − 80.133𝑥1
𝑠      if    0.66 ≤ 𝑥1
𝑠 ≤ 1.00     or    0.00 ≤ 𝑥2
𝑠 ≤ 0.33
                                 (41) 
A similar approach can be used to linearize the assigned equilibrium flow of the paths ending at the 
investigated retailer (Figure 4 and Equations 42 and 43).  
(
𝑎𝑚−(1.65𝑥1
𝑠+1.5𝑥2
𝑠)
𝑏(2+|𝑅(𝑚)|)
)𝑥1
𝑠 = {
3.520 + 600.66𝑥1
𝑠   if  (0.00 ≤ 𝑥1
𝑠 ≤ 0.33  or  0.66 ≤ 𝑥2
𝑠 ≤ 1.00)           
47.08 + 468.66𝑥1
𝑠    if     (0.33 ≤ 𝑥1
𝑠 ≤ 0.66     or    0.33 ≤ 𝑥2
𝑠 ≤ 0.66)
135.47 + 334.6𝑥1
𝑠     if     (0.66 ≤ 𝑥1
𝑠 ≤ 1.00     or    0.00 ≤ 𝑥2
𝑠 ≤ 0.33)
               
(42) 
(
𝑎𝑚−(1.65𝑥1
𝑠+1.5𝑥2
𝑠)
𝑏(2+|𝑅(𝑚)|)
)𝑥2
𝑠 = {
663.1 − 800.66𝑥1
𝑠  if  0.00 ≤ 𝑥1
𝑠 ≤ 0.33  or  0.66 ≤ 𝑥2
𝑠 ≤ 1.00           
619.5 − 668.66𝑥1
𝑠    if     0.33 ≤ 𝑥1
𝑠 ≤ 0.66     or    0.33 ≤ 𝑥2
𝑠 ≤ 0.66
530.9 − 534.66𝑥1
𝑠     if     0.66 ≤ 𝑥1
𝑠 ≤ 1.00    or    0.00 ≤ 𝑥2
𝑠 ≤ 0.33
                    
(43) 
After piecewise linearization, an approximation of equilibrium flow function corresponds to: 
(
𝑎𝑚|𝑚∈𝑡−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)𝑥𝑡
𝑠 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
?́?𝑡,1
𝑠 + ?́?𝑡,1
𝑠 𝑥𝑡
𝑠
?́?𝑡,2
𝑠 + ?́?𝑡,2
𝑠 𝑥𝑡
𝑠
…
 ?́?𝑡,𝐾𝑡𝑠
𝑠 + ?́?𝑡,𝐾𝑡𝑠
𝑠 𝑥𝑡
𝑠
      
𝑖𝑓           0 ≤ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 < ?́?𝑡,1
𝑠
𝑖𝑓        ?́?𝑡,1
𝑠 ≤ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 < ?́?𝑡,2
𝑠
…
𝑖𝑓      ?́?𝑡,𝐾𝑡𝑠−1
𝑠 ≤ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 < 1
      (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)       (44) 
APPENDIX C 
We describe how the multi-part linear functions developed in Section 3.4 can be substituted into the proposed 
model (22-32) to transform it into a mixed integer linear (MIL) mathematical model. Existing commercial 
optimization software such as LINGO, CPLEX, and GAMS can be used to solve the linearized model. In order 
to substitute these functions in the model, we need to define some new binary variables that determine which 
part of the substituted multi-part profit and flow functions should be considered. 𝛼𝑡,𝑘
𝑠  and ?́?𝑡,𝑘
𝑠  are binary 
variables that are equal to 1 if variable 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 accepts a value in part k (𝑘 = 1, 2,… , 𝐾𝑡
𝑠) of its piecewise linearized 
profit and flow function respectively; 0 otherwise. Notice that ∑ 𝛼𝑡,𝑘
𝑠𝐾𝑡
𝑠
𝑘=1 = 𝑤𝑚 and ∑ 𝛼𝑡,𝑘
𝑠𝐾𝑡
𝑠
𝑘=1 = 𝑤𝑚(∀𝑡 ∈
𝑇(𝑚), ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀). Using these newly defined variables, the following term is substituted in place of the nonlinear 
profit term in the objective function (22): 
(
𝑎𝑚|𝑚∈𝑡+∑ 𝑐𝑟
|𝑅(𝑚)|
𝑟=1 +∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
(2+|𝑅(𝑚)|)
− 𝑐𝑡)(
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)𝑥𝑡
𝑠 = ∑ 𝛼𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 (𝜃𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 + 𝜗𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 𝑥𝑡
𝑠)
𝐾𝑡
𝑠
𝑘=1 , (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)   (45) 
Where 
∑ 𝛼𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 𝛿𝑡,𝑘−1
𝑠𝐾𝑡
𝑠
𝑘=1 ≤ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 ≤ ∑ 𝛼𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 𝛿𝑡,𝑘
𝑠𝐾𝑡
𝑠
𝑘=1                                                      (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)           (46) 
Nonlinear equilibrium flow function in Constraints (23) and (24) will be substituted by the following terms: 
(
𝑎𝑚−∑ 𝑐?́?𝑥?́?
𝑛|𝑇
(𝑚)|
?́?=1
𝑏𝑚(2+|𝑅
(𝑚)|)
)𝑥𝑡
𝑠 = ∑ ?́?𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 (?́?𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 + ?́?𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 𝑥𝑡
𝑠)
𝐾𝑡
𝑠
𝑘=1                                 (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)           (47) 
Where 
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∑ ?́?𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 ?́?𝑡,𝑘−1
𝑠𝐾𝑡
𝑠
𝑘=1 ≤ 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 ≤ ∑ ?́?𝑡,𝑘
𝑠 ?́?𝑡,𝑘
𝑠𝐾𝑡
𝑠
𝑘=1                                                      (∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆)           (48) 
Linearization of the multiplication of a binary and a continuous variable in (35) and (38) is straightforward. 
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